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The semiotics of signlessness:
A Buddhist doctrine of signs
MARIO D’AMATO

In his formulation of the doctrine of signs, Charles Sanders Peirce makes
the claim that the ‘meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation’ (1.339).1 According to Peirce, three elements are necessary
for semiosis to occur: sign, object, and interpretant. Regarding this last
element, Peirce states, ‘the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation,
it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series’ (1.339). Klaus
Oehler, in interpreting Peirce’s semiotic doctrine, states that because ‘every
sign must, as a matter of definition, be interpretable’, this ‘presupposes the
existence of at least one other sign’, which ‘presupposes another sign . . . ad
infinitum’ (1987: 7). Oehler refers to this argument as ‘the semiotic proof
of the interminability of every process of interpretation’ (1987: 7). Jacques
Derrida, reflecting on Peirce’s formulation, states that the ‘representamen
functions only by giving rise to an interpretant that itself becomes a sign
and so on to infinity. The self-identity of the signified conceals itself
unceasingly and is always on the move’ (1976: 49). Umberto Eco, reflecting on Derrida’s reading of Peirce’s formulation, states that while Peirce
does put forward the idea of what Eco calls ‘unlimited semiosis’, Peirce
also holds that there is ‘a true conclusion of semiosis and it is Reality
(5.384). . . . There is an ideal perfection of knowledge (5.356)’ (1990: 40).
In this paper, I consider a Buddhist response to the issue of unlimited
semiosis: In other words, I offer a Buddhist account of how unlimited
semiosis should be understood. I do this by following the doctrine of signs
offered in an Indian Buddhist text of the Maham yam na from circa the fourth
century CE, a text known as the Mahamyamnasmutramlam
D kamra (Ornament
to the Scriptures of the Great Vehicle; hereafter, ‘the Ornament’). Perhaps
the most interesting aspect of Buddhist semiotics, from both a historical
and a philosophical point of view, is that in its theorizing of the semiotic
process, Buddhist semiotics is directed toward bringing this process to
its end or terminus — whether this means its ultimate perfection or its
complete cessation. In Buddhist discourse, the ultimate end of semiosis is
conceived in terms of a soteriological goal: one that is understood to be
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186 M. D’Amato
salvific in some final sense. In considering these issues, I offer this paper as
a contribution to the general history of semiotics.

Contextualizing a Buddhist doctrine of signs
Assuming with Charles Morris that the history of semiotics is ‘useful both
as a stimulus and as a field of application’ for semioticians (1971: 65–66),
we may note that inadequate attention has been given to the history of
non-Western traditions of the doctrine of signs. John Deely in particular
has called attention to the gaps in our understanding of the history of
semiotics in India and China — areas where Buddhist intellectual traditions have certainly played a decisive role.2 Thus, in order to come to a
more complete view of the history of the doctrine of signs, it is necessary
to develop further perspectives on Buddhist semiotic traditions. Another
reason for conducting work in Buddhist semiotics may be found in the
occasional appropriation of Buddhist terms, concepts, and themes in certain Western texts on semiotics. Here, for example, we might mention
Roland Barthes’s use of the Zen Buddhist term satori,3 or Floyd Merrell’s
description of semiosis in relation to ‘nothingness’ and ‘emptiness’
(sa um nyatam ).4 A closer analysis of a Buddhist formulation of the doctrine of
signs would, then, both expand our view of the general history of semiotics
and allow us to deepen our reflections on the possibility of adopting or
adapting Buddhist semiotic terms, concepts, and themes.
Some work on Buddhist semiotics has already been carried out. Because
this work has not to my knowledge been comprehensively reviewed, it
might be useful to make the initial moves toward doing so here. First, however, I would like to delimit the kind of work that I have in mind. In his
writings, Morris proposes a distinction between pure and descriptive
semiotics. He states that this distinction ‘simply marks the difference
between the formative discourse of semiotic [i.e., pure semiotics] and its
designative discourse [i.e., descriptive semiotics], that is, the difference
between semiotic as logic and semiotic as scientific discourse’ (1971: 303).
In his foreword to Deely’s Introducing Semiotic: Its History and Doctrine,
Thomas Sebeok offers the metaphor of two tracks in semiotics, one that is
‘inward-turning’, concerned with ‘the doctrina signorum for its own sake’,
and another that ‘leads outward into the general culture . . . with incursions into all the humanities and social sciences’ (Deely 1982: x–xi). While
the former track is akin to Morris’s pure semiotics, the latter is akin to
descriptive semiotics. In the context of the study of Buddhism, we might
reformulate the distinctions between pure/descriptive and inward-turning/
outward-turning as a distinction between an analysis of Buddhist semiotics
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and a semiotic analysis of Buddhism: While the former would be an
analysis of a Buddhist doctrine of signs (as, for example, is given in this
paper), the latter would be a semiotic analysis of Buddhist cultural forms.
Acknowledging the difficulties involved in any attempt to rigorously
establish the ultimate validity of such distinctions, I offer this one as a
heuristic device for situating the present discussion of the Ornament’s
doctrine of signs within broader conversations in semiotics. So given the
topic of this paper, in my brief overview of other relevant work, I pick out
only studies that I consider to be primarily concerned with the analysis
of a Buddhist doctrine of signs.
The most thorough overview of the topic of Buddhist semiotics is Fabio
Rambelli’s article on Buddhism in the Encyclopedia of Semiotics (Rambelli
1998). In this article, Rambelli discusses Buddhist philosophy of language
and semiotics,5 pointing out that the Yogam cam ra tradition may present ‘the
most influential Buddhist model of semiosis’ (Rambelli 1998: 96). According to his account, Buddhism offers two semiotic models, one for ordinary
knowledge that ‘confuses a presumed ontological reality . . . with the ordinary psychomental phenomena and processes (modalities and functions
of the mind) that create that reality’, and one for ‘true and absolute knowledge . . . prajñam or bodhi’ (Rambelli 1998: 97). Rambelli points out that the
attainment of this true knowledge, according to Buddhism, involves the
transformation of cognition and the end of semiosis.6
Peter Harvey’s detailed study (1986) is a lucid monograph on the various
‘signless’ (animitta) states that occupy an important place in conceptions
of the path to nirvam nD a. As Harvey points out, according to a standard
trope in Buddhist discourse, there are three entrances to nirvam nD a: emptiness (sa unyata
m
m ), signlessness (animitta), and desirelessness (apranD ihita).7 In
his study, Harvey identifies the range of meanings for the term nimitta
(‘sign’) in Pam li materials. Some of the meanings he specifies are:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)

A deliberately made sign . . .
A natural sign or indication . . .
A specific type of natural sign — a sign of what is to come . . .
A marker . . .
A (male or female) sexual organ . . .
Characteristic . . . (Harvey 1986: 31–32)

Harvey summarizes by stating that a nimitta is a ‘delimited object of
attention, that may, or should be taken as indicating something beyond
itself or the general features of that to which it belongs’ (1986: 33). He
indicates how Pam li texts link the signless states to the characteristic of
impermanence, and writes that according to a Buddhist account of such
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states, ‘When the mind thoroughly contemplates any item of becoming . . .
as impermanent, it overcomes the sign of permanence, etc., so as to
perceive merely a stream of changing sense-objects not “indicative” of
anything but themselves’ (Harvey 1986: 43); furthermore, in a later state
there is not even the perception of the sign of sense-objects. In fact, Harvey
concludes that according to these texts, the ultimate goal of nirvam nD a (Pam li,
nibbam na) is an entirely objectless consciousness; he states that in the realization of the highest goal, ‘consciousness (viññam nD a) has no object, not even
a signless one, but is nibbam na’ (Harvey 1986: 48).
Janet Gyatso makes a related point in her discussion of Rdo Grubchen’s theory of dham ranD i (a ‘literal formula, perhaps with “magical”
powers’) (1992: 173). In her article, Gyatso posits that Rdo Grub-chen’s
theory also looks to the potential end of the semiotic process in Buddhism.
Interpreting dham ranD i in relation to Peirce’s three categories of signs — icon,
index, and symbol — she argues that we may understand the ‘very special
type of semiosis that would operate in Rdo Grub-chen’s dham ranD i practice’
as one in which ‘the sign reaches full iconicity’, and hence ‘semiosis
self-destructs (or, better, attains a “zeroed semiosis”)’ (Gyatso 1992: 194).
A number of other studies are also relevant to an analysis of a Buddhist
doctrine of signs, even though they do not directly address that topic.
David Zilberman offers thoughts on ‘the starting conditions of semiotic
theorizing and why in principle they can differ’ (1988: 247).8 He posits
that ‘the skeptical state of mind seems to be the only genuine pre-condition
of semiogenesis’ (Zilberman 1988: 248) and reflects on the implications of
considering Buddhism to be a form of skepticism. Alexander Piatigorsky
(1984), in his study of the Abhidharma theory of dharmas (‘phenomenological units’), makes use of concepts and methods in Western semiotics
to explore this important Buddhist theory. Mention should also be made
of two studies relating Derrida’s work to Buddhism: Magliola (1984),
which discusses the methodology of Derrida in relation to that of the
Madhyamaka Buddhist thinker, Nam gam rjuna; and Wang (2001), which
compares Derrida’s account of semiosis to the accounts of three Buddhist
thinkers, Kumam rajiva, Paramam rtha, and Xuanzang. And if we accept
Peirce’s architectonic of the sciences, wherein logic is understood
as a branch of semiotics — the branch which comprises ‘the formal science
of the conditions of the truth of representations’ (2.229) — then to the
works listed here we must also add the extensive research on Buddhist
logic.9 Richard Hayes’s book (1988) may be pointed out as a study of
Buddhist logic that highlights the semiotic dimensions of Dignam ga’s
system.10
Because the text I am discussing is a specifically Indian Buddhist one, in
order to situate its doctrine of signs more fully in its historical context, it
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might also be useful to highlight some studies of Indian semiotics. An
excellent overview of Indian sign conceptions is offered by Bimal K.
Matilal and J. C. Panda (1997). The authors state that the ‘earliest reference, in Indian thinking, to signs as cognitive and communicative tools’
may be seen in the Lokam yata philosophy of circa the sixth century BCE;
they specify that the important term translated as ‘sign’ here is lindga, or
‘whatever stands out from an object in direct observation’ (Matilal and
Panda 1997: 1827). They also state that other terms translatable as ‘sign’
may be found in Indian literature, including the Vedic term, laksD ma
(‘specific characteristics, marks and indications’), a term which contributed to the formation of the word laksD anD a (Matilal and Panda 1997). The
authors introduce Indian semiotics in the areas of logic and theory of
argumentation, grammar and semantics, poetics and aesthetics, and the
sciences of geometry, mathematics, and medicine. Insofar as the article
reads as a concise introduction to the history of Indian thought, it serves as
a testament to the possibility that semiotics may be seen as an underlying
concern of diverse discourses. While acknowledging the ubiquitous importance of signs in Indian intellectual culture, the authors express their
surprise that in the history of Indian thought ‘there is no text which deals
with the (abstract) theory of signs’ (Matilal and Panda 1997: 1853). In
what follows, however, I hope to show that at least one section of one
Indian text — viz., the Ornament — explicitly offers such a theory.
Piatigorsky and Zilberman focus on identifying ‘the earliest, textually
confirmable situation which . . . can be understood as the emergence of
sign-manipulation’ in Indian thought (1976: 256). Through an examination of uses of various forms of the term laksD anD a (‘sign’) in the UpanisD ads,
the authors conclude that the term is unknown in UpanisD ads dating from
the eight to the sixth centuries BCE, but emerges as a term meaning ‘sign’
in UpanisD ads from the sixth to the fourth centuries BCE. The authors
proceed to hypothesize that the emergence of the term laksD anD a as ‘sign’
may have been a result of ‘the appearance of Buddhism and other heterodoxical teachings . . . [whose] exponents . . . refused to follow the esoteric
Brahmanical path . . . and so forced the masters of [the] UpanisD ads to burst
out with unprecedented semiotic activities, in order to assimilate or eliminate the newcomers’ (Piatigorsky and Zilberman 1976: 260).11 Thus the
authors posit a crucial role for Buddhism in the emergence of the doctrine
of signs in India. Piatigorsky also offers a short discussion of ‘Indic sign
conceptions’ in Sebeok’s Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics (Sebeok
1986, vol. 1),12 which covers some of the same ground as his article with
Zilberman. In it, he states that the ‘two main terms denoting “sign” (or
“mark”) in practically every Indian philosophical, religious or scientific
school were laksD anD a and nimitta’ (Sebeok 1986: 346); and these are indeed
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the two terms for ‘sign’ that are relevant to our discussion of the
Ornament’s semiotic doctrine.
Edwin Gerow (1984) looks at Peirce’s trichotomy, icon, index, and
symbol, in relation to Indian conceptions of gaunD i, laksD anD am , and dhvani,
respectively. He explains that according to the Mimam m
D saka conception
of Kumam rila and others, in the case of gaunD i (lit., ‘relating to a quality’)
the meaning of an assertion is found in ‘the isolation of a quality common
to both terms [of the assertion]’; for example, the assertion ‘Devadatta is
a lion’ means that Devadatta is fierce (Gerow 1984: 247). In the case of
laksD anD am (‘secondary signification’) the meaning of a word ‘is not the direct
“relation” of signification itself [viz., of word to object] . . . but an
additional relation to a third term’; for example, the word ‘spears’ may
signify ‘spear-having men’ through the relation of ‘possessor-possessed’
(Gerow 1984: 246). Gerow then states that according to the theory of
m nandavardhana (ninth century CE), dhvani (lit., ‘sound, tone’; ‘suggesA
tion’) may involve secondary signification while ‘arriving at still another
sense’, which is exemplified by irony (Gerow 1984: 252). He concludes
that the difficulty in mapping the three Indian conceptions onto Peirce’s
trichotomy ‘points to the problem that Indians have had with a genuine
notion of “thirdness” apart from “similitude” and “opposition”’ (Gerow
1984: 254). I would suggest that this is perhaps not the case, and that the
concept of laksD anD am may indeed be understood as participating in the
category of thirdness.13
Edward Small examines the ‘emphasis upon, or seeming disregard for,
“reference”’ in the traditions of American and Continental semiotics,
respectively (1987: 447). He reflects on Saussure’s distinction of ‘signifiersignified’ in relation to the Sanskrit concept of nam ma-rmupa (‘name and
form’) in the hopes of an ‘increased insight into the a-referential hermeneutic of Saussure’s “sign”’ (Small 1987: 457). Indeed, both formulations
emphasize the relation between two elements, rather than the cooperation
of three elements, as in Peirce’s doctrine of signs. Small makes the point
that on a Saussurean account, ‘each attempt to exhibit a possible signreferent only realizes another sign’ (Small 1987: 451), which hints at a
Saussurean doctrine of unlimited semiosis.
To conclude this brief overview of work on Indian semiotics, we must
also note that the extensive research on Indian logic — and here I especially mean the Nyam ya tradition — would be indispensable to any
thorough history of the doctrine of signs in India. Although various
secondary sources ably introduce and discuss Indian logic, the second
volume of Karl Potter’s Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (1977) is a
useful guide to the contents and philosophical concerns of primary sources
of the Nyam ya tradition up to circa 1350 CE.
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The text I examine here, the Ornament, is a Sanskrit doctrinal treatise
composed circa the fourth century CE. The text purports to be presentation of various Maham yam na themes relevant to the path of a bodhisattva
on the way to buddhahood. It is contained in both the Tibetan and the
Chinese canons of Buddhist works — the only extant canons that include
Maham yam na Buddhist texts — and is classified by both as belonging to the
Yogam cam ra school (lit., the school of the ‘practice of spiritual discipline’),
one of the two major doctrinal systems of Indian Maham yam na Buddhism.
In contemporary historical-critical scholarship, the Yogam cam ra is usually
identified in terms of its focus on the forms and functioning of consciousness, and discussions of the Yogam cam ra often make reference to its eightfold
model of consciousness, which adds the store consciousness (am layavijñamna) and the afflicted mind (klisD Dta-manas) to the standard six
consciousnesses of Buddhism (viz., the visual, aural, olfactory, gustatory,
tactile, and mental). Yogam cam ra discourse has its beginnings in perhaps the
fourth century CE, with the formation of the Sam
D dhinirmocana-smutra and
the Yogamcam rabhmumi. Our text postdates this early strata of Yogam cam ra
materials, but almost certainly predates the classical formulation of Indian
Yogam cam ra, as put forward in the works of Asandga and Vasubandhu (circa
400 CE).14
The section of the Ornament that I examine occurs in the 11th of the
text’s 21 chapters. It is not a long section, comprising only eight verses out
of the text’s some 804 in total. Nevertheless, the concerns of the section are
relevant to the central soteriological themes and aims of the text, and other
sections of the text are brought into consideration. The 11th chapter of
the Ornament, according to the title given in the commentary, is on the
‘Investigation of the dharma’ (here dharma means ‘Buddhist teaching’).
The section I examine focuses on an analysis of the ‘signified, signifier, and
signification’ (laksD ya, laksD anD a, and laksD anD am , respectively). Because we are
dealing with a discourse on signs that was not composed in a European
language, a note on terminology is in order. The terms translated as ‘signified’, ‘signifier’, and ‘signification’ are all nominal forms from the Sanskrit
root √laksD , which means ‘to mark, sign, characterize, define, indicate’.
Thus, laksD anD a, here ‘signifier’, also means ‘symbol, characteristic, definition’, and even ‘a symptom or indication of disease’.15 As noted earlier,
various Sanskrit terms may be translated as ‘signifier’ or ‘sign’ (e.g., lindga,
nimitta, sam
D jñam ). In this paper, I only focus on the terms laksD anD a and
nimitta in restricted contexts, which I take to be relevant to the Ornament’s
doctrine of signs. In order to distinguish the terms in my discussion, I
translate laksD anD a as ‘signifier’ and nimitta as ‘sign’, although the decision
here is somewhat arbitrary.
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It should also be noted that the term laksD anD am — here translated as ‘signification’ — is commonly understood in Sanskrit grammatical literature to
refer to the secondary significance or metaphorical meaning of a word.16
K. Kunjunni Raja argues that while Pam nD ini (circa fourth century BCE)
does not actually discuss the role of laksD anD am (‘secondary sense, metaphorical transfer’) in his grammatical treatise, the AsD Dtam dhyam yi, he was
aware of such uses of words (1965: 177). In his monograph on Indian
Theories of Meaning, Kunjunni Raja points out that analyses of secondary
significance (laksD anD am , upacam ra, etc.) may be found in Patañjali’s
Maham bham Dsya (a commentary on Pam nD ini’s treatise from circa the second
century BCE), the Nyam yam -smutras, the Mimam m
D sam -smutras, and other influential texts (1963: 233–242). Given the long and distinguished understanding
of laksD anD am as ‘secondary significance’ in Sanskrit literature, one might
question why I have translated the term as ‘signification’. In response,
I would point out that in the context of a Buddhist understanding of
language, there is ultimately no distinction between a sign’s secondary
significance and its signification. As Kunjunni Raja points out, according
to Buddhist logicians, ‘there is no primary referent for a word’ in the first
place — all objects are ultimately empty of inherent nature — hence, the
significance of every word is secondary or metaphorical (Kunjunni Raja
1963: 247). Thus, in the absence of a primary significance, we may refer
to the so-called ‘secondary significance’ as the ‘signification’.17
So again the doctrine of signs in the Ornament that we consider here is
found in the text’s discussion of the ‘signified, signifier, and signification’.
Before turning to that doctrine, it would be useful to specify precisely in
what I understand any doctrine of signs to consist. As should be clear from
the opening paragraph, I intend to situate this analysis of a Buddhist
doctrine of signs in the context of Peirce’s semiotics. While the semiotic
tradition in the West may be traced from the pre-Socratics, Plato, and
Aristotle, through the Stoics, Augustine, and medieval scholastics, to
Locke, Leibniz, and Hume, I believe that Oehler is right in emphasizing the
importance of Peirce’s formulation of a ‘triadic structure of the concept of
the sign’ for contemporary semiotics (Oehler 1987: 8).18 Whereas other
thought on signs often focuses on the binary relation of the signifier to the
signified,19 Peirce points out that a complete account of semiosis necessarily involves not two but three elements: the sign, the object, and the
interpretant.20 He states, ‘by “semiosis” I mean . . . an action, or influence,
which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its
object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way
resolvable into actions between pairs’ (5.484). So on Peirce’s account, in
order for semiosis to occur it is not sufficient for there to simply be a sign
and that which it stands for; there must also be the third element, that of
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the interpretant. Thus, in Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (published 1901–1905), Peirce defines ‘sign’ as follows: ‘Anything
which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to
which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming
in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum’ (Peirce 1991: 239).21 Regarding the
sign, Peirce offers various classifications, including, for example, the three
classes of icon, index, and symbol (2.304), and the ten classes based on
three trichotomies (2.254–264).22 Regarding the object, Peirce states
that it need not be an actually existent object, it may be something ‘only
imaginable’ (2.230), and Eco points out that in the case of a proposition
about a fictional character, ‘its object is only an imaginary world’ (1979:
181). And regarding the third element necessary for semiosis, the interpretant, Peirce defines it as ‘the proper significate outcome of a sign’
(5.473) or the ‘proper significate effect’ (5.475). As Eco emphasizes, ‘The
interpretant is not the interpreter (even if a confusion of this type occasionally arises in Peirce)’; rather it is ‘another representation which is referred to
the same “object”’ (1976: 68). Following Peirce’s account (8.184), Oehler
offers a lucid statement of the classification of three sorts of interpretants:
(1) the immediate interpretant, that is the interpretant which manifests itself in the
correct understanding of the sign, i.e., what is called the meaning of the sign, (2) the
dynamic interpretant, that is, the actual effect of the sign, the reaction which a sign
provokes, and (3) the final interpretant, that is, the effect that the sign would have
in every awareness if circumstances were such that the sign could evince its full
effect. (Oehler 1987: 6)

Thus, the interpretant is the meaning of a sign, the actual effect of the sign,
and the idealized full possible effect of the sign — or in Peirce’s own words,
‘that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were
reached’ (8.184). As we turn to the Ornament’s doctrine of signs with
its elements of the signifier, signified, and signification, I would suggest
that these three be considered in relation to Peirce’s sign, object, and
interpretant, respectively.

A Buddhist doctrine of signs
The Ornament’s verses on the doctrine of signs, as mentioned above, occur
in the 11th chapter of the text, immediately following a two-verse section
that deals with the doctrine of representation-only (vijñam pti-mam tratam ),
according to which it is only the mind itself that constructs the appearance
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of subject and object — i.e., there is no ultimate distinction between a
perceiving subject and a perceived object, although the mind mistakenly
takes there to be. This thesis highlights the importance of a doctrine of
signs for the text: On a Maham yam na Buddhist account, through seizing
on the signs or characteristics of things, mind functions according to a
conceptual matrix that is not in accordance with the way things really are,
and this occurrence is the very basis of suffering. Thus, to give a semiotic
interpretation to the three entrances to nirvam nD a — signlessness, desirelessness, and emptiness — if signs and semiotic processes were to be properly understood, signifying could be brought to an end, seizing on things
would terminate, and the ultimate emptiness of all phenomena would be
realized.
The first element in the Ornament’s doctrine of signs is the signified
(laksD ya); the text states:23
sadrD sD tDikam
D ca yac cittam
D tatram vastham vikam ritam /
laksD yam etat samam sena hy apramam nD am
D prabhedatahD //
Mind along with what is observed, the conditions therein, and the unchanging: this
concisely is the signified. But with respect to its subdivisions, it is unmeasurable.
(Ornament 11.37)

Although this verse may seem concise to the point of being abstruse (a
situation not uncommon in Indian Buddhist sa am stras, or technical treatises),
the commentary accompanying the text makes matters more perspicacious. The commentary takes the four categories of the signified according
to the text and relates them to a standard Buddhist set of five categories of
existents, as follows:24
Terms Used at 11.37
mind
what is observed
the conditions
the unchanging

Corresponding Categories of Existents
consciousness (vijñamna) and form (rmupa)
mental factors (caitasika-dharmas)
factors not associated with mind
(citta-viprayukta-dharmas)
the unconditioned (asam
D skrD ta)

This fivefold set of categories of existents may be found in traditional
Abhidharma texts, a genre that includes some of the earliest strata of
systematic doctrinal thought in Indian Buddhism. In commenting on the
fivefold categories of existents, Erich Frauwallner states that this scheme
‘represents an attempt to record exhaustively all the elements of being
and order them systematically’ (1995: 146); hence, we may understand the
signified in the Ornament’s semiotic doctrine to encompass all possible
existents. Taking our cue from a restatement of Quine’s dictum in a
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semiotic key — ‘To be is to be a signified’25 — we may consider the text’s
presentation of the signified in relation to its ontological doctrine. There
are two specific points I want to make in this regard. The first is that
the text reduces the traditional category of form or materiality to a subcategory of mind, which indicates the tendency toward ontological idealism in the Ornament’s classification of the signified. The second point is
that although the text identifies four categories of signifieds (which map
onto the standard five categories of existents), we should not understand
the text’s final position on the question of ontology to be that there are
ultimately four categories of existents. According to a standard Abhidharma account, a distinction must be made between secondary and
primary existents: While secondary existents (e.g., the conventional objects
that make up the world, including persons, medium-sized objects, etc.)
are mere designations or conceptual constructions, primary existents (viz.,
the momentary events that comprise secondary existents) are the actually
existent objects of reality.26 According to the Maham yam na Buddhist conception of emptiness (sa unyata
m
m), however, all phenomena are without inherent
nature, and hence from the ultimate point of view, there are no objects at
all: From an ultimate point of view, there is nothing to be signified.27 Thus,
the four categories of signifieds are to be ultimately understood as mere
designations or conceptual constructions. This position will have important implications for the Ornament’s doctrine of signs, because it hints that
signs may actually function as empty signifiers.
Here, I would like to pause in my exegesis of the text’s doctrine of signs,
and say a few words on Peirce’s categories of firstness, secondness, and
thirdness. These three categories were offered by Peirce as an attempt
to construct a fundamental classificatory scheme, not unlike the categories
of Aristotle or Kant (1.300). Briefly, firstness refers to the characteristics
of feeling, quality, immediacy, freedom, independence, something in itself
without relation to an other (1.302–311; 6.32);28 secondness refers to
action, causation, resistance, constraint, dependence, in short something
in relation to an other, for example, the relation of ego to non-ego (1.322–
334); and thirdness refers to representation, mediation, meaning, process,
continuity, in short something as it mediates between something else and
an other (1.337–349).29 As I stated above, Peirce draws on these categories
in order to arrive at his threefold classification of signs. What I wish
to emphasize here, however, is not the congruence of Peirce’s threefold
classification of signs with the types of signs found in the Ornament,
but rather the utility of Peirce’s fundamental categories in interpreting the
Ornament’s classification of signs.
So turning to the second element in the Ornament’s doctrine of signs
— viz., the signifier (laksD anD a) — we see that the text identifies three forms
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of signs, offering two verses on the first and one each on the remaining two.
The three signs discussed by the text correspond to the three natures
(tri-svabhamva), which comprise what is perhaps the most significant
ontological doctrine in Yogam cam ra philosophy.30 According to this doctrine,
the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabham va) refers to the appearance of
unreal objects which are imagined in terms of a subject-object duality, an
ultimately false and illusory duality according to Yogam cam ra philosophy;
the dependent nature (paratantra-svabham va) refers to the occurrence of any
unreal imagination, an occurrence which is dependent on causes and
conditions; and the perfected nature (parinisD panna-svabham va) refers to
thusness, reality as it is in itself, which is understood to be entirely
inexpressible.31
On the first of the three signs, the imagined signifier (parikalpitalaksD anD a), the text states:
yatham -jalpam rtha-sam
D jñam yam nimittam
D tasya vam sanam /
tasmam d apy atha vikhyam nam
D parikalpita-laksD anD am
D //
yatham -nam mam rtham arthasya nam mnahD prakhyam natam ca yam /
asam
D kalpa-nimittam
D hi parikalpita-laksD anD am
D //
The imagined signifier is the sign of the conceptualization of objects in terms of
discourse, the habits of that [discourse], and moreover the distinct perceptions
from those [habits].32 The imagined signifier — the sign of a false construct — is the
perception of name and object as name and object. (Ornament 11.38–39)

In considering what is stated about the imagined signifier in these two
verses, I think it is important to note that this type of sign is described in
terms of three aspects, which I take to imply that this sign should properly
be understood in terms of Peirce’s category of thirdness. The three aspects
of the imagined signifier are (1) the conceptualization of objects in terms
of discourse, which the commentary explains as the mental function of
conceiving of an object in terms of language (yatham ’bhilampam); (2) the
habits (vamsanam) that arise due to that discourse,33 the various tendencies
that occur as a result of such discourse; and (3) the distinct perceptions —
the perceptions of distinct objects — that arise based on those habits. In
the second verse, the imagined signifier is defined in terms of the ‘perception of name and object’. According to this verse, an imagined signifier
is one in which there is a perception of a given name in relation to some
posited object. So, here again, three elements are associated: name, object,
and perception. I would suggest that these three elements correspond
to (1), (2), and (3), respectively: The name is what occurs in discourse;
the occurrence of an object qua object — that is, as some particularly
delimited, definable, distinct object — is a result of the habits of discourse;
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and the perception of name and object is simply a distinct perception of
some particular object. When there is a sign with these three aspects (with
the threefold structure of name/object/perception), then such a sign is
imagined: It is constructed through a process of unreal imagination.
According to the Ornament, then, such signs are to be known for what they
really are, viz., the results of imaginative constructions which impute
reality where there is none.
The second type of sign is the dependent signifier (paratantra-laksD anD a);
the text states:
trividha-trividham bham so gram hya-gram haka-laksD anD ahD /
abhmuta-parikalpo hi paratantrasya laksD anD am
D //
The threefold-threefold appearance has the characteristic of object and subject; it
is unreal imagination, which is the signifier of the dependent. (Ornament 11.40)

In considering the dependent signifier, note that this type of sign is
described in terms of two aspects, which implies that it may be understood
in terms of Peirce’s category of secondness. The two aspects of the dependent signifier are its object aspect and its subject aspect. From the commentary to this verse, we may see that each of these two aspects is specified
in terms of three further aspects, as follows:
Object Aspect
appearance of words
appearance of meanings
appearance of forms

Subject Aspect
mind (afflicted mind, encompassing awareness
of ‘self’)
apprehension (five sensory consciousnesses:
visual, etc.)
conceptual discrimination (mental consciousness)

So according to this verse and its commentary, a dependent signifier has
the aspects of object and subject; hence, it has a twofold character. In terms
of its object aspect, a dependent signifier is one that takes on the appearances of words, meanings, and forms (or referential objects); and in terms
of its subject aspect, a dependent signifier is one that involves some form
of functioning consciousness. Note, however, that a dependent signifier
does not entail the imputation of actual existence to an object, but only the
occurrence of some word, meaning, or form to some mode of consciousness. We might state this in other terms by saying that a dependent signifier
represents a shift from the (imagined signifier’s) trichotomy of name/
object/perception to the dichotomy of representation/consciousness. So in
a dependent signifier any element of an actually existent, external object is
eliminated; as such, this type of sign is superior to an imagined signifier
from a Yogam cam ra point of view, because it does not involve the imputation
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of existence to an erroneous object. As the verse states, a dependent
signifier is ‘unreal imagination’, but it does not involve the erroneous
conceptualization of actually existent objects that occurs as a result of such
imagination.
The third and final type of sign is the perfected signifier (parinisD pannalaksD anD a); the text states:
abham va-bham vatam yam ca bham vam bham va-samam natam /
aasam nta-asam ntam ’kalpam ca parinisD panna-laksD anD am
D //
Having the quality of non-existence and existence as well as the identity of
existence and non-existence, unpacified and pacified, and without construction:
this is the perfected signifier. (Ornament 11.41)

In this verse, we see the perfected signifier described in terms of the
dichotomies of non-existence/existence and non-pacification/pacification,
and also in terms of being without construction. According to the commentary, this description offers the three specific characteristics of the
perfected signifier. Its first characteristic is that a perfected signifier
indicates the non-existence of the imagined nature of phenomena, but it
also indicates what actually exists, viz., reality itself. In fact, this sign is
indistinguishable from reality itself because, as the commentary states, the
‘perfected signifier is thusness’.34 And I take this to imply that the perfected
signifier should be understood in terms of Peirce’s category of firstness.35
Its second characteristic is that it is unpacified because any afflictions that
occur are only adventitious (am gantukopaklesa a) — thus, it never needs to be
brought to peace — and it is pacified because that is the fundamental
nature (prakr
D ti) of the perfected signifier, because it is always already at
peace. And its third characteristic is that it is not characterized by conceptual discrimination (in the commentary’s terms, it is avikalpam ), because it is
free from conceptual proliferation (because it is nisD prapañcatam ).36 Hence,
according to the Ornament, the perfected signifier is so complete that
it entirely encompasses that which it signifies: The perfected signifier is
reality itself. Here, we should note that we are no longer dealing with a
conventional conception of a sign that could designate some distinct
object; rather here we have some sort of ultimate conception of an unlimited sign, one whose contours are not drawn where the signifier ends and
the signified begins. We might even say that the perfected signifier is a sign
whose contours are not drawn at all; it is understood as not participating
in discursivity in any way. The perfected signifier does not involve the
imagined signifier’s trichotomy of name/object/perception, or even the
dependent signifier’s dichotomy of representation/consciousness, but
rather arrives at the singularity of immediacy: The perfected signifier is
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thusness itself, without the mediation of discursivity and without unreal
imagination.
From this discussion of the three types of signs according to the
Ornament, we now turn to the final element of the text’s doctrine of signs:
signification (laksD anD am ). It is here that we see perhaps the most particularly
Buddhist aspect of the Ornament’s semiotic doctrine. On signification, the
text states:
nisD panda-dharmam am lambya yoniaso manasi-kriyam /
cittasya dham tau stham nam
D ca sad-asattam rtha-paasyanam //
samatam gamanam
D tasminn am rya-gotram
D hi nirmalam
D/
samam
D viasisD tD am anyum nam nadhikam
D laksD anD am matam //
Supporting the immovable teaching, fundamental mental application, abiding in
the sphere of mind, observing existent and non-existent objects,
and arriving at equality therein, which is the noble spiritual lineage — which
is untainted, identical, distinct, and neither deficient nor excessive: this is how
signification is to be understood. (Ornament 11. 42–43)

Here, the commentary explains that these verses refer to the fivefold stages
of spiritual discipline (pañcavidham-yoga-bhmumi), which are the stages of
support, applying, mirror, light, and basis (amdham ra, am dhamna, am darsa a, am loka,
and am sa raya, respectively).37 These same stages of spiritual discipline are
also given by Asandga in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, another important
Yogam cam ra text, which postdates the Ornament.38 A sub-commentary to the
Ornament, the Mahamyamnasmutram lam
D kamra-vDrtti-bham Dsya by Sthiramati (circa
550 CE), relates each of these five stages to a standard set of five paths or
progressive stages of spiritual development that are found in Yogam cam ra
texts (including the Ornament itself).39 These correspondences may be
explained as follows: (1) The ‘immovable teaching’ is the ‘support’ of spiritual development, which occurs through listening to Buddhist teaching,
and corresponds to the path of accumulation; (2) ‘fundamental mental
application’ is ‘applying’ oneself to the teaching, and corresponds to the
path of application; (3) ‘abiding in the sphere of mind’ is the spiritual discipline of functioning as a ‘mirror’ through the practice of the concentration
of mind (samam dhi), and corresponds to the path of vision; (4) ‘observing
existent and non-existent objects’ is metaphorically like a ‘light’, which
through supramundane wisdom is able to illuminate what is existent
and what is not existent, and corresponds to the path of cultivation; and (5)
‘the noble spiritual lineage’ — the lineage of buddhas — is the attainment
of buddhahood, which entails the transformation of the ‘basis’, and occurs
on the path of completion. So here we see that signification (laksD anD am ) is
understood in terms of a fivefold process wherein one listens to the dharma
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(i.e., Buddhist teaching), applies oneself to it, practices concentration, cultivates wisdom, and ultimately transforms oneself through the attainment
of buddhahood. This set of processes, culminating in the ‘transformation
of the basis’ (amsa raya-param vDrtti) is what the Ornament understands to be the
‘proper significate effect’ of signs. So according to this doctrine of signs,
the ‘final interpretant’ of a perfected signifier — or in Oehler’s words, ‘the
effect that the sign would have in every awareness if circumstances were
such that the sign could evince its full effect’ (1987: 6) — would be the
complete transformation of the entire semiotic process, and the attainment
of buddhahood.
This transformation of the basis is further described in other sections
of the text, and in the commentary this transformation is specifically linked
to the end of semiotic processes: the signless (animitta). For example, the
commentary to 11.11 states that the transformation of the basis is being
established in the signless;40 and the commentary to 19.54 states that the
transformation of the basis occurs when signs are not perceived (nimittasyam khyam natam), and when thusness is perceived (tathatam yam Dh khyam natam ).41
This statement occurs in the commentary to 19.48–56, a section of the text
on the topic of ‘thorough knowledge in accordance with reality’. One of
the more significant verses here for our purposes states:
puratahD stham pitam
D yac ca nimittam
D yat sthitam
D svayam
D/
sarvam
D vibham vayan dhimam n labhate bodhim uttamam m
D //
Eliminating everything — the sign that was previously established and the one that
remains of its own accord — the wise one attains the highest awakening. (Ornament
19.50)

Here, the commentary explains that the first sign refers to the sign of
persons (pudgala-nimitta), indicators of the existence of persons, and the
second sign refers to the sign of all phenomena (sarva-dharma-nimitta),
indicators of the existence of phenomena.42 To properly interpret this
verse, we must recall the Ornament’s ontological doctrine, and the distinction between secondary and primary existents. On the Ornament’s
account, it is important to realize the emptiness or lack of inherent nature
of secondary existents (such as persons), as well as the emptiness of primary existents (the momentary events that comprise secondary existents).
Thus, all phenomena (all signifieds) are to be ultimately understood
as nothing more than conceptual constructions. And because there are
ultimately no objects, there is nothing for signs to refer to. Hence, the
highest awakening entails the end of semiosis.
So from what has been said above, we can see that according to
the Ornament’s doctrine of signs, the signified is understood as objects
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classified according to the categories of existents, objects that are ultimately taken to be empty of inherent nature; the sign is classified into three
types, the imagined signifier, the dependent signifier, and the perfected
signifier; and signification (interpreted here in terms of Peirce’s ‘interpretant’) refers to the fivefold stages of spiritual discipline, culminating in
the transformation of the basis, which entails the end of semiosis.

On the semiotics of signlessness
I began this paper with a number of quotes identifying what we might,
along with Eco, refer to as the doctrine of unlimited semiosis: the doctrine
that signs lead to interpretants, which in turn become signs leading to
interpretants, etc. Semiosis according to this doctrine is interminable, at
least potentially. However, before proceeding any further, I believe it is
important to attempt to clarify just what might be meant by the term
‘unlimited semiosis’. It seems to me that there are at least three interpretations of this term that should be clarified and separated from one another.
According to the first, semiosis is unlimited in the sense that any sign could
in principle lead to any other sign; it is unlimited because there are no
limitations or restrictions on the movement from one sign to another:
There is only a free play of signifiers. This sense of ‘unlimited semiosis’ is
one that is not endorsed by the Ornament — a perfected signifier would not
lead to any other sign — and thus we need not consider it here. According
to the second interpretation, semiosis is unlimited in the sense that it could
in principle potentially be extended to infinity. And according to the third
interpretation, semiosis is unlimited in the sense that it necessarily extends
to infinity: It can in principle never be brought to an end. It seems to me
that while our text would affirm the second sense of ‘unlimited semiosis’, it
would reject the third sense.43 Hence, I think it would be useful to maintain
a distinction between a conception of semiosis as potentially unlimited and
a conception of semiosis as necessarily unlimited. For a Buddhist doctrine
of signs to uphold the latter conception would be to deny the very goal of
Buddhism itself.
It should be clear from this analysis that while semiosis is indeed understood to be potentially unlimited on a Buddhist account, the proper
Buddhist response to this unlimited process is to effect its end or terminus.
In fact, semiosis is itself understood to be one of the most fundamental
barriers — if not the most fundamental barrier — to awakening according
to the Ornament (recall, e.g., 19.54). Hence, in order to reach the pinnacle
of spiritual realization, viz., the unexcelled, complete awakening of
buddhahood, it is necessary to bring semiosis to its end. And here an
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interesting question might be raised: Because Buddhism is directed toward
the end of semiosis, should it be understood as ‘regressive’ from a semiotic
point of view? That is to say, should Buddhism be understood to be
directed toward some state that is logically (but not necessarily temporally) prior to the possibility of semiosis? Although it might be tempting to
respond in the affirmative here — and support for such a response might
indeed be found in other quarters of the vast field of Buddhist discourse —
I believe that the most reasonable reading of the Ornament’s account
would conclude that the ultimate goal is not to ‘regress’ to a pre-semiotic
condition, but rather to arrive at a completely perfected mode of semiosis
wherein there is no longer a barrier between the sign and reality itself:
When everything has been signified, when the sign encompasses all
possible interpretants (signs), then a state of semiotic perfection has been
attained and semiosis has been brought to its completion.44 So perhaps
in the context of Buddhist semiotics, we are not so much speaking of the
possibility of a ‘transcendental signified’ as we are about a ‘transcendental
signifier’, or perhaps a ‘signless signifier’. Just what such terms might
mean is what I hope I have signified in all that has been said above.

Notes
1. Earlier in this passage, Peirce equates ‘representation’ with ‘sign’. Following what has
become standard practice in Peirce scholarship, references to writings in the Collected
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce 1931–1958) are cited by volume and paragraph
number. Note, however, that the multi-volume chronological edition of Peirce’s work,
which is currently in progress, is superior to the Collected Papers in scope, organization,
and editing: Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Max H. Fisch et al.,
eds. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982–).
2. He states that Bochenski’s A History of Formal Logic ‘suggests that an archeology of
semiotic consciousness comparable to the present effort might be done for the East,
replacing the Organon with the Nyamya-smutra, for example’ (Deely 1982: 146, n. 3). Deely
is rather optimistic about the possible effects of such an ‘archeology’, having claimed
that ‘semiotic historiography will be achieved only by upsetting and revising, often
in radical ways, the conventional outlines and histories of thought’, and that such
historiography ‘must inevitably take the form also of a structuring anew of the entire
history of ideas and of philosophy’ (Deely 1982: 1–2). Such claims must be understood, I
believe, as based on Peirce’s thesis that ‘all thought is in signs’ (Peirce 1991: 49; addressed
in the fifth of his ‘Questions concerning certain faculties claimed for man’).
3. ‘Writing is after all, in its way, a satori: satori (the Zen occurrence) is a more or less
powerful (though in no way formal) seism which causes knowledge, or the subject, to
vacillate: it creates an emptiness of language’ (Barthes 1982: 4). Later in the book, Barthes
speaks of the goal of Buddhism in semiotic terms, saying that perhaps satori is ‘the blank
which erases in us the reign of the Codes, the breach of that internal recitation which
constitutes our person’ (Barthes 1982: 75).
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4. See Merrell 1991, especially chap. 8, sec. 1. Also see Merrell 1997: 338ff., in which he
discusses the five skandhas (‘heaps’, ‘aggregates’) of Buddhist philosophy in relation to
Peirce’s categories. In looking at Buddhism in Western semiotic discourse, Rambelli
(1998: 97–98) mentions Barthes, Merrell, and other semioticians who have used
Buddhist metaphors and concepts.
5. Buddhist philosophy of language is an area that has been and continues to be of great
interest to scholars of Buddhism. For an introduction to the topic, see Gómez 1987.
Hamlin 1983 presents an interesting discussion of the Land kamvatamra-smutra’s views of
language.
6. Rambelli is also the author of a number of pieces on the semiotics of esoteric Buddhism
in Japan; see Rambelli 1991, 1994a, and 1994b.
7. For a discussion of these three entrances to liberation in the context of the Ornament, see
D’Amato 2000a: 91–94.
8. This concern for the origins and necessary conditions for semiotic theorizing may also be
seen in Zilberman’s article with Piatigorsky, which is referred to below.
9. According to Peirce’s architectonic, the study of semiotics has three branches: pure
grammar, logic proper, and pure rhetoric (2.229). On this account, the study of semiotics
is fundamental to the study of logic, and principles arrived at in the formal doctrine of
signs would apply to logic proper.
10. In commenting on the process of carrying out an inference for oneself according to
Dignam ga’s system — a system specifying that such an inference occurs through the cognition of a sign — Hayes states, ‘The term “sign (linga)” refers to a property that serves as
evidence for another property that shares the sign’s locus’ (1988: 231). Thus, such an
inference may be understood as a carefully delimited and specific form of semiosis.
11. The implication here is that before these ‘newcomers’, Upanisadic knowledge was
unquestioned and hence ‘there was no need to signify (“mark”) the knowledge for the
sake of securing evaluative identification (=verification)’ (1976: 257). Note that
Piatigorsky and Zilberman’s conclusion that ‘semiotics . . . emerged in India somewhere
in the sixth century B.C.’ (1976: 264) need not be understood as opposed to the claim of
Matilal and Panda that no Indian text deals with the abstract theory of signs (1997:
1853), because the latter authors — in using the term ‘abstract’ — seem to be referring to
a formal doctrine of signs detached from any contextually specific field of application.
12. In the same work, J. Frits Staal offers discussions of ‘Indic grammarians’ and ‘Indic
logicians’. In East and West, Sergiu Al-George discusses ‘Sign (laksD anD a) and propositional logic in Pam nD ini’ (1969). Again, according to Peirce’s scheme, Indian grammar and
logic would both be important branches of Indian semiotics; see n. 9.
13. Even in Gerow’s own account of laksD anD am (1976: 246–247), and the example of ‘spears’
meaning ‘spear-having men’, there are the three elements of the signifier, the signified,
and the relation of ‘possessor-possessed’.
14. This information on the Ornament and the Yogam cam ra school is drawn from D’Amato
2000a, where other works on the history of the Yogam cam ra are also discussed.
15. It is perhaps no mere coincidence that the Oxford English Dictionary’s first definition of
semiotics is ‘the branch of medical science relating to the interpretation of symptoms’.
16. The standard example given in Sanskrit literature is the sentence gandgamyamm
D ghosD ah
D,
which literally means, ‘The village is on the Ganges’, but which is understood to mean —
through the secondary significance of the word gandgamyamm
D — ‘The village is on the bank
of the Ganges’.
17. This is not to imply that Buddhists offer no account of ‘secondary significance’.
For example, in his commentary to the Trim
D sa ikam, Sthiramati (who also composed a
sub-commentary to the Ornament) specifies that three conditions are necessary for

204 M. D’Amato

18.
19.

20.

21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

the occurrence of metaphor (upacaram). However, such accounts must be understood as
operating at the conventional level of everyday discourse, where the existence of objects
is posited. On these points, see Kunjunni Raja 1963: 245–249.
On other triadic models of the sign, see Nöth 1990: 89–91.
Although Morris (who follows Peirce) acknowledges the importance of this dimension
of semiotics — calling it the semantical dimension (‘the relation of signs to their
designata and so to the objects which they may or do denote’) — he also emphasizes the
syntactic dimension (the relation of signs to other signs) and the pragmatic dimension
(the relation of signs to their interpreters); see Morris 1971: 28–54.
Fisch (1986) provides an excellent historical overview of Peirce’s formulation of
semiotics (or, as Fisch points out, in Peirce’s terms, semeiotic, semeiotics, semiotic, or
semeotic — but never semiotics). He divides the history of Peirce’s doctrine of signs into
three ‘foundings’: The first has its basis in Peirce’s publication of ‘On a new list of categories’; the second in his six articles on the ‘Illustrations of the logic of science’, including
the pieces, ‘The fixation of belief’ and ‘How to make our ideas clear’; and the third in his
writings on pragmatism composed between 1903 and 1911. Fisch also states that ‘the
semeioticians who were soon to begin thinking of Peirce as founder of modern semeiotic
had in mind chiefly his published writings of this last period’ (Fisch 1986: 338). In my
brief account of Peirce’s doctrine of signs, I base myself primarily on writings from this
third period.
Here again, we see the thesis of unlimited semiosis.
The three classes of signs and the trichotomies that are the basis of the ten classes of signs
are laid out in terms of Peirce’s categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. On
Peirce’s classes of signs and attempts to diagram the sets of relations between them, see
Farias and Queiroz 2000.
The quotations from the Sanskrit text of the Ornament, identified by chapter and verse,
are drawn from Lévi’s (1907) edition. All translations are my own.
See Lévi 1907: 64.
See Quine 1980: 15; ‘To be is to be the value of a variable’.
On this distinction, see Williams 1981: 237ff. In this article, Williams also addresses the
question of how there can be discourse about non-existent entities from an Abhidharma
(specifically Vaibham sD ika) Buddhist point of view.
The Ornament states: ‘All phenomena are without self; according to ultimate truth, there
is emptiness’ (18.101). Note, however, that this is not taken to imply that there is nothing
at all. Rather, what there is, is an indescribable thusness (tathatam), a pure firstness in
Peirce’s terms.
In discussing the category of firstness, Peirce states that something belonging to this
category cannot be compared to anything else, but rather ‘is a suchness sui generis’
(1.303).
These categories are discussed in various locations of Peirce’s work. For an excellent
discussion of the categories, and their historical development in Peirce’s thought, see
Esposito 1980.
The correspondence between the three signifiers (or ‘three characteristics’; tri-laksD anD a)
and the three natures (tri-svabhamva) in Yogam cam ra thought is so close that the two formulations may often be effectively treated as indistinguishable, as in Boquist’s (1993) study
of the three-nature theory. The three signifiers and three natures are not, however,
explicitly equated either individually or collectively in the Ornament or its commentary.
Thus, we can read the tri-laksD anD a as a semiotic doctrine, and the tri-svabhamva as an
ontological one.
The account given here follows 11.13–29 and its commentary. A more detailed analysis
of this section of the text and its commentary may be found in D’Amato 2000b.
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32. The referents of the demonstrative pronouns here are provided by the commentary to
the Ornament (see Lévi 1907: 64: tasya jalpasya vamsanam tasmamc ca vamsanamd . . .).
33. Edgerton’s Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary defines the term vamsanam as
‘impression, result of past deeds and experience on the personality’, and also as ‘habit,
inclination, propensity’. I have chosen ‘habit’ here in order to draw out the resonances
with Peirce’s thought. Peirce has much to say about habit in his writings; here I adduce
only one passage: ‘It is by virtue of mental association (we moderns should say), that
things are in the mind habitualiter’ (Peirce 1991: 126).
34. See Lévi 1907: 65: parinisD panna-laksD anD am
D punas tathatam.
35. Recall that Peirce describes firstness as ‘suchness sui generis’ (1.303).
36. See Lévi 1907: 65.
37. See Lévi 1907: 65.
38. Asandga’s account of the stages is in accordance with the account given in the commentary to the Ornament. Asandga’s account is elaborated a bit further in the commentary to
his text, known as the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhamsD ya (which Tatia attributes to
Sthiramati); for this elaboration, see Tatia 1976: 100.
39. Sthiramati’s sub-commentary is found in the Tibetan canon of Buddhist treatises,
the Derge Tanjur (Tom hoku no. 4034); the relevant section here is at sems-tsam MI
189a2–4. A good overview of the five paths in Yogam cam ra literature is given by Davidson
1985: 342–361.
40. See Lévi 1907: 57.
41. See Lévi 1907: 170. Also note that the commentary to 13.1 links the perfected nature
(which is related to the perfected signifier) to the signless (Lévi 1907: 84).
42. See Lévi 1907: 169.
43. According to W. B. Gallie’s interpretation of Peirce, this would also be the sense of
unlimited semiosis affirmed by Peirce; Gallie states that ‘Peirce himself emphasizes
repeatedly, that this endless series [of signs] is essentially a potential one’ (Gallie 1966:
126).
44. Further support for this interpretation may be seen in the text’s definition of
buddhahood as an ‘awareness of all modes of appearance’ (sarvamkamra-jñatam; 9.2).
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